




EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S.
MARKET
THOMAS W. BATES* AND
JAMES S. LINCK**
T
he presence of a controlling shareholder is a
common ownership structure in the United
States and United Kingdom, and a predominant
organizational form in other world markets as noted
in La Porta et al. (1999). The discrepancy between
effective control and the fractional cash flow rights
of a controlling shareholder give rise to the potential
agency conflicts commonly characterized private
benefits of control. A controller can obtain private
benefits through several channels including self-
dealing in the firm’s contracting or production rela-
tionships or by adopting preferred capital structure
or dividend policies. Recent work by Johnson et al.
(2000) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) suggest that
the private benefits for controllers can be substan-
tial, but vary across legal regimes and with the qual-
ity of jurisdictional enforcement of the minority
claimants’ rights.
In the U.S., a market characterized by relatively
strong protections for minority claimants,the specter
of self-dealing is particularly pronounced when a
corporation’s controlling shareholder bids for the
remaining minority equity stake in the firm, transac-
tions commonly referred to as minority freeze-outs.
Freeze-out bids often garner the attention of the
business press and legal community because, unlike
a typical change-in-control bid, the pricing of minor-
ity shares in freeze-out transactions does not emerge
from an arm’s-length negotiation between indepen-
dent parties.Thus, while freeze-out bids are, in many
cases,subject to judicial review,transaction structure
and the allocation of any transaction surplus are
commonly believed to be a byproduct of the conflict
inherent in disparate ownership interests.1
In Bates, Lemmon and Linck (2006) we addressed
concerns regarding bid quality and transactional
conflict in freeze-out transactions by analyzing the
bid characteristics and deal outcomes for a sample of
freeze-out proposals involving U.S. public corpora-
tions between 1988 and 2003.To address issues asso-
ciated with the pricing of minority claims and the
distribution of any transaction surplus, our analysis
examined the shareholder wealth effects of these
transactions for both target (minority) and bidding
(controlling) shareholders, thereby providing a per-
spective on the relative wealth gains to transaction
participants and the extent of any disproportionate
gains to controllers.We also considered whether con-
trolling shareholders were able to propose transac-
tions that minimized vigorous negotiation and limit-
ed price discovery during freeze-out bid negotiation,
characteristics that would suggest that minority
claimants lack adequate representation by their
directors or efficient legal recourse or both.
Specifically, the analysis considers the incidence and
efficacy of bid hostility, the rate of bid completion,
and the likelihood and extent of any revisions to the
initial bid premiums proposed by controllers.
The market for freeze-out transactions in the U.S.
The U.S. marketplace provides an interesting setting
for an analysis of freeze-out activity generally, and
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the potential for controller self-dealing specifically, for
several reasons.First,the incidence of freeze-out trans-
actions increased rapidly over the last decade,a period
coinciding with the financial collapse of the dot.com
industry and an increase in the costs of remaining pub-
lic mandated by the Sarbanes Oxley Act and contem-
poraneous rule changes adopted by the NYSE and
NASDAQ stock exchanges. As illustrated in the
Figure, freeze-out transactions accounted for roughly
5 percent of the overall merger and acquisition activity
in U.S.markets between 1988 and 2005.Freeze-out bid
activity peaked in 2000 with 47 completed freeze-out
transactions, while 2002 saw the highest proportion of
freeze-out activity when over 8 percent of the merger
and acquisition bids for publicly traded companies
involved a controlling shareholder.
A second consideration is that freeze-out transac-
tions likely represent a primary channel through
which a controller might realize private benefits of
control in the U.S. The degree to which controller
self-dealing takes place is a function of the target’s
statutory environment and the extent to which the
relevant legal standards are enforced. Prior studies
note a substantial degree of cross-country variation
in these characteristics. For example, Dyck and
Zingales (2004) suggest that the value of control
varies from – 4 percent to + 65 percent of the value
of the firm. Notably, they suggest the U.S. has one of
the lowest implied values of control in the world.
Given relatively high shareholder protections in the
U.S.,freeze-out transactions presumably present one
of the few opportunities for controllers to expropri-
ate value from a minority. Bebchuk and Kahan
(2000) argue that freeze-out bids are motivated by a
discrepancy between the market price of minority
shares and the present value of investment opportu-
nities known exclusively to the
controlling shareholder.Informa-
tion asymmetry, combined with
the potentially limited role of tar-
get directors as information
agents for the minority, suggests
that controlling shareholders can
capture a portion of deal surplus
that would otherwise accrue to
the minority shareholders in a
comparable full-information
negotiation.This effect is exacer-
bated by the fact that a control-
ling shareholder’s ownership in
the target virtually eliminates the
potential for third-party bid com-
petition, thereby reducing a controller’s own incen-
tive to offer a premium that might otherwise be nec-
essary to deter a competing bidder.
Finally, as we describe in the section that follows,
judicial interpretation of freeze-out law in the U.S.
developed significantly over the last decade. These
changes impart an important source of potential
variation in bid outcomes across time and transac-
tion structure.
Legal treatment of freeze-out transactions
Delaware courts have long recognized the potential
for self-dealing by controllers and corresponding
limitations on the objectivity of a target firm’s direc-
tors in freeze-out bids.2 As such, the associated legal
doctrine establishes a fiduciary duty of the controller
to the minority shareholders and applies a corre-
sponding fairness standard in the judicial review of
these transactions.This fairness standard discourages
merger bids that are structurally coercive while
encouraging full information and arms-length nego-
tiation between a controller and a fully empowered
negotiating committee comprised of a target’s inde-
pendent directors.
In contrast to a merger freeze-out bid, the Delaware




















































































Source: Securities Data Corporation (2006), Domestic Mergers and Acquisitions Database.
FREEZE-OUT OFFERS IN THE U.S.
Number of freeze-out offers Proportion of freeze-outs to all M&A deals
in %
2 Although we emphasize Delaware law in this piece, many deal
requirements, particularly those associated with disclosure and
coercion, have corollary federal legal standards. For example, full
disclosure and coercion are addressed in Securities and Exchange
Commission rules 10b-5 and 13e-3.While each state jurisdiction has
its own laws and courts, many adopt Delaware standards as they
pertain to control transactions. Delaware standards might not
apply uniformly to freeze-outs, a conjecture we incorporate into
our empirical analyses.freeze-outs structured as tender offers directly to the
minority given the voluntary nature of the decision to
tender shares. Specifically, provided a tender offer is
not structurally coercive, that it includes full disclo-
sure of a bidder’s private information as well as a
non-waivable majority of the minority tender condi-
tion, the transaction is not subject to judicial review
under the entire fairness standard.We note,however,
that even in the context of a tender offer freeze-out
the target board typically appoints a special commit-
tee of independent directors to evaluate the transac-
tion and issue a recommendation to minority share-
holders. Gilson and Gordon (2003) suggest that by
1995 practitioners generally assumed that freeze-out
tender offers would be subject to the alternative stan-
dard. This perspective was challenged and substan-
tively upheld in a series of recent Delaware court
decisions beginning with the Siliconix case in 2001.3
This shift in the doctrinal regime of judicial review
has lead many academics and practitioners to decry
the current legal standard as doing little to protect
minority claimants from controller self-dealing, par-
ticularly in the context of freeze-out bids structured
as tender offers. Of course, it remains unclear
whether or not,even absent the possibility of judicial
review, controlling shareholders would be able to
convince minority claimants to tender into substan-
dard bids barring a coercive bid structure such as a
two-tiered bid.As is the case for tender offers involv-
ing a change-in-control bid, a rational atomistic
shareholder who does not perceive his/her stake as
being pivotal to the offer’s success will not tender
unless the price offered in the tender offer is as high
as the expected price after the tender offer,resulting
in bids that distribute a large portion of the surplus
to tendering shareholders. Furthermore, the eco-
nomic and reputational incentives of target directors
may be sufficient to motivate them to negotiate vig-
orously with a controller,despite no direct obligation
to do so in a post-Siliconix regime.
Data description
We compiled our sample from the Securities Data
Corporation’s (SDC) mergers and acquisitions data-
base. Observations include bids defined as either
mergers or bids for the remaining interest of publicly
traded target firms listed on U.S.financial exchanges.
From this sample, we exclude American depository
receipts, real estate investment trusts, closed-end
funds, and primes and scores.This screening yielded
4,079 acquisition bids between 1988 and 2003. Of
these, 148 were freeze-out bids where acquirers held
a toehold in the target of between 50 percent and
90 percent.For comparison purposes,we benchmark
outcomes in freeze-out transactions to two sets of
arms-length transactions: bids proffered by bidders
holding non-controlling equity toeholds (< 50 per-
cent) in the target and bids involving no pre-bid
equity stake in the target.Of the 4,079 takeover bids
described above, we identify 3,732 bids with no bid-
der toehold and 186 bids involving a bidder with a
minority toehold in the target.
Wealth effects of freeze-out transactions
We estimated the wealth effects associated with
freeze-out bid announcements using a 3-day cumula-
tive abnormal return (CAR) to target and bidding
shareholders. Abnormal returns are computed as a
firm’s equity return minus the contemporaneous
return on the value-weighted market index.
Controlling for bid form,completion,and target firm
characteristics, the average announcement CAR to
target shareholders in freeze-out bids is positive
(14.9 percent), but is significantly lower than the
average announcement CAR to target shareholders
in both minority toehold bids (19.6 percent) and no
toehold bids (19.2 percent). While these results are
suggestive, transaction and ownership distortions
make it difficult to accurately assess bid quality or
relative shareholder welfare in freeze-out bids using
only bid premiums or target equity returns.First,bid-
ders already exercise operating control over the tar-
get prior to the bid thereby lowering the incremental
gains, and the corresponding returns, to freeze-out
transactions relative to our benchmark change-in-
control transactions. Second, given the bidder’s toe-
hold, a portion of the observed change in the bid-
der’s market value is attributable to the change in
the value of the shares it owns in the target.
To obtain a more complete perspective on share-
holder welfare, we estimate the total wealth surplus
generated in successful bids and estimate the relative
distribution of these gains between bidders and tar-
gets. We focus on the distribution of transaction
value between deal participants relative to their pro
rata share of the target firm’s equity held immedi-
ately prior to the bid announcement.We benchmark
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these results to those obtained in transactions where
the bidder holds a minority toehold and no toehold
in the target prior to the transaction. Table 1 sum-
marizes the results. Of the 148 freeze-out transac-
tions in our sample, 120 involved completed bids
with a publicly traded bidder. Consistent with the
notion that the value gains to freeze-outs are lower
than those in change-in-control transactions, the
average total wealth gains (target and bidder) to
freeze-out bid announcements is $55.1 million, com-
pared to $88.4 million for minority toehold bids and
$118.9 million for no-toehold bids.
The remaining rows of Table 1 summarize how these
gains are split between bidders and targets in freeze-
outs and our benchmark change-in-control transac-
tions. In freeze-out bids, 38.2 percent of announce-
ment period surplus accrues to minority sharehold-
ers while bidding shareholders receive 61.8 percent.
Comparable target/bidder splits for no-toehold and
minority toehold bids are 84.7 percent/15.3 percent
and 100.9 percent/–0.9 percent, respectively.
However, in freeze-out bids minority claimants own
only 23.1 percent of the target firm’s equity; hence,
they receive an allocation of bid surplus that exceeds
their pro rata share of the firm by 15.1 percent or
$8.3 million. This is similar to the 15.5 percent
($13.7 million) excess distribution observed for tar-
gets in bids involving minority toeholds,and exceeds
the relative distribution to targets in no toehold bids
where target shareholders capture 84.7 percent of
the total wealth gains while holding 100 percent of
the target’s equity prior to the bid. Overall, the evi-
dence on wealth effects and the distribution of trans-
action surplus in freeze-out bids is inconsistent with
the notion that these transactions, on average, are a
byproduct of controller self-dealing. In fact,
observed distributions suggest that a substantial
degree of exercised or implied bargaining power is
often wielded by minority shareholders and their
agents during freeze-out negotiations.
Explicit negotiation during freeze-out bids
We complement our analysis of wealth effects by
providing evidence on the prevalence and effective-
ness of explicit bid negotiation. Freeze-out negotia-
tions typically occur with a special committee of the
target’s board of directors. While the dialogue
between controllers and special committees is unob-
servable, agents often issue public statements
regarding the deal’s status including whether or not
a bid was rejected. In the case of a tender offer, rec-
ommendations to tender or withhold shares are pro-
vided through a 14D-9 filing. If target representa-
tives are unable or unwilling to negotiate with con-
trollers, or if information asymmetry is extreme, we
would expect to observe a lower incidence of bid
hostility and bid revisions, but a higher incidence of
bid completion for freeze-out bids relative to a
benchmark sample of arms-length change-in-control
transactions.Alternatively,the economic and reputa-
tion incentives of independent directors, the
prospect of judicial review and legal recourse, and a
shareholder’s own incentive to holdout in tender
offers may be sufficient to generate negotiation that
approaches what otherwise would obtain during an
arms-length bids.
Table 2 summarizes the results of multivariate logis-
tic regressions modeling the likelihood of bid hostil-
Table 1 
Merger and acquisition wealth distributions across transaction type




Number of Observations 2,783 107 120
Mean abnormal market value change 118.9 88.4 55.1
Distribution of gains to targets and bidders 
Percent of gains to targets 84.7% 100.9% 38.2%
Percent of gains to bidders 15.3% -0.9% 61.8%
Target gains relative totheir pro-rata share
Target's pro-rata share of firm 100.0% 85.4% 23.1%
Target's share of gains minus pro-rata share –15.3% 15.5% 15.1%
Mean excess gains (losses) to targets ($millions) –18.2 13.7 8.3
Surplus to targets (aggregate) as a proportion of their
pro-rata claim 84.7% 118.2% 165.2%
Source: Authors.ity,bid completion,and revisions to initial bid premi-
ums. The regressions in Table 2 incorporate toehold
category indicator variables equal to one if a bid-
der’s equity stake in the target six months prior to
the bid announcement falls within either the minori-
ty toehold (0.0 percent < toehold < 50.0 percent) or
freeze-out (50.0 percent ≤ toehold < 90.0 percent)
category. The regressions also include a variety of
deal characteristics as control variables. We report
standardized coefficients for each variable that rep-
resent the change in the probability of bid hostility,
deal completion,or a bid revision for a change in the
explanatory variable from zero to one,or a one stan-
dard deviation change in a continuous variable,hold-
ing all other variables constant at their means. The
statistical significance of each effect is summarized
by p-values reported in parentheses.
The incidence of explicit bid hostility is low (less
than 10 percent) for merger and acquisition activity
during our sample period. Controlling for bid char-
acteristics, the results suggest
relatively small differences in
the likelihood of observing a
hostile response in freeze-out
bids compared to our bench-
mark minority toehold and no
toehold change-in-control trans-
actions. Specifically, the rate of
bid hostility in freeze-out trans-
actions is equivalent to the rate
in no toehold bids and only 3
percent lower than the hostility
rate in minority toehold bids. In
unreported results we further
document that, for the subsam-
ple of freeze-out transactions the
incidence of bid hostility is 18.5
percent higher for deals struc-
tured as tender offers relative to
freeze-outs structured as merger
bids.These findings are inconsis-
tent with the premise that repre-
sentatives of the minority
claimants are passive during
freeze-out transaction or that
controlling shareholders reliably
avoid conflict with minority
shareholders or their represen-
tatives by structuring transac-
tions as freeze-out tender offers.
Of the 4,079 bids in our sample,
3,302 are ultimately completed and 777 are with-
drawn. Holding contract, bid, and negotiation char-
acteristics constant, we find that completion rates
are approximately 5.7 percent higher in freeze-out
bids compared with no-toehold bids and 4.6 percent
higher than the rate for minority toehold bids. Deal
completion rates are also higher for tender offers
and bids including bidder equity, but they are lower
for follow-on bids.Notably,bids that receive a hostile
reception are 55.1 percent less likely to be complet-
ed suggesting that,although completion is more like-
ly in freeze-out transactions, bid resistance, when
observed, is highly effective at deterring unwanted
bids.Given our results on bid value,we presume that
a higher rate of bid completion for freeze-out bids is
a function of the favorable distributions offered to
minority shareholders, rather than a byproduct of
controllers pushing through self-serving bids.
The last column of Table 2 summarizes the determi-
nants of bid revisions for the transactions in our sam-
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Table 2 
Likelihood of bid hostility, bid completion and bid revisions
Dependent variable Hostility Completion Bid Revision
Sample All Bids All Bids All Bids
Number of observations 3.750 4.079 3.750


















Target termination fees –0.056 0.146 0.032
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.004)
Acquirer Lockup –0.042 0.085 –0.010
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.412)
Tender offer 0.037 0.128 0.051
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001)
Offer includes bidder equity –0.018 0.071 0.040
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Prior Bidding Indicator 0.032 –0.076 – 
(<0.001) (<0.001) – 
Relative value of target 0.018 –0.066 –0.007
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.147)
Deal Attitude (1=hostile) –  –0.551 0.401
 –  (<0.001) (<0.001)
Litigation Indicator –  –0.019 0.068
 –  (0.383) (<0.001)
Log(Initial Premium) 0.000 –  –0.025
(0.906) –  (0.060)
Model Chi-square 197.33 138.41 341.93
(p-value) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Pseudo R
2 0.146 0.242 0.089
   Source: Authors.CESifo DICE Report 1/2007 27
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ple.We observe bid premium revisions for 387 of our
3,750 sample bids with available premium data,37 of
which occur during freeze-out negotiations. Relative
to the no toehold bids in our sample, freeze-out bids
are 14.5 percent more likely to entail a revision to an
initial bid proposed by controllers.These results are
consistent with the presence of bid tension in freeze-
out offers that exceeds what is observed during an
arm’s-length negotiation, a finding that again con-
forms to the notion that minority claimants and their
agents vigorously negotiate with controllers and
have a fair degree of success in the process of price
discovery.
Concluding remarks
The U.S. market witnessed a recent surge in acquisi-
tion bids initiated by controlling shareholders seek-
ing to acquire the remaining shares of minority
claimants in the firm, transactions commonly
referred to as minority freeze-outs.Practitioners and
legal scholars have long been engaged in an ongoing
debate regarding the inherent conflicts that arise in
these transactions and the corresponding bid out-
comes that obtain for minority shareholders. Over
the last 5 years, this debate has intensified following
a reduction in the standard of review over freeze-
outs executed in U.S. jurisdictions. Our findings indi-
cate that, on average, economic incentives and legal
protections adequately insulate minority sharehold-
ers from outright expropriation during freeze-out
bidding.In fact,our analysis of the distribution of bid
surplus and the evidence for explicit bid negotiation
suggests that freeze-out bids are often contested
transactions and yield proportional wealth gains in
excess of what is observed in otherwise equivalent
arms-length change-in-control bids. These results
hold even in an era characterized by lower judicial
oversight,suggesting the economic incentives of deal
participants likely outweigh any legal constraints
applied through judicial review of transaction fair-
ness. Overall the methodologies and results summa-
rized here provide a necessary economic foundation
from which to assess arguments concerning the wel-
fare of minority shareholders in freeze-out transac-
tions generally.
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